![]() ![]() ![]() In ancient Chinese thoughts, de is a comparatively complicated idea. As the review reveals, the purpose, processes, affect and motivation and social perceptions that are associated to the concept of academic learning in Western and East-Asian settings are influenced by equally elaborated cultural traditions and can be meaningfully interpreted in the framework of mind and virtue orientations. These two orientations are proposed to represent cultural mandates of learning in the respective cultures and are suggested to influence a variety of cultural tasks that can be clustered into four domains. In the virtue orientation, the moral dimension is just as much associated with learning as the cognitive, focusing on the development of the person as a whole. Characteristic of the Western mind orientation is for learning to be primarily attributed to the cognitive domain. beliefs in East-Asia can be characterized as ‘virtue oriented’. Building on the qualitatively derived themes of mind and virtue orientations by and, we argue that the Western philosophical tradition has led to a ‘mind orientation’ in learning, whereas learning. Read moreĭoes the meaning of learning vary across cultures? In order to answer this question we propose a theoretical framework that integrates various reported cultural differences in the domain of learning. Furthermore, the proposed solutions reveal their authors to be committed not only to a problematic conception of good character, but also to a troublesome conception of the difference between character traits and other practical dispositions that are sometimes distinguished from character traits – pathologies, disorders, proficiencies, talents, abilities, and personality quirks. To begin with, they fail to accommodate the very phenomena they were designed to accommodate. Unfortunately, some of the best-known attempts to make room for the common moral responses at issue are worse than unhelpful. ![]() Contemporary Aristotelians are aware of this difficulty. To see why Hume so received this doctrine, I begin with this problem confronting Aristotelians: the contrast between true virtue and mere continence seems to leave one unable to make sense of a significant arena of our everyday moral responses. Hume's reception of the old Aristotelian saw, we might say half smiling, was mixed. My concern in this essay is with Hume's appropriation of one of the most central elements of Aristotle's ethics – the distinction between “true virtue” and “mere continence.” Hume well understood this distinction but he also held that while there can be morally significant differences between someone who acts in the face of temptation and someone who is not conflicted in acting as he ought, the latter state is not always morally preferable to the former. of both Aristotelian megalopsychia and Ciceronian magnitudo animi. Hume's Treatise discussion of “greatness of mind,” for instance, deliberately appropriates elements. It is nevertheless clear that Hume had the ancients in general, and Aristotle in particular, in his sights at various junctures in his moral philosophy. In Hume's philosophical corpus, there are only ten passages that explicitly mention Aristotle, and only two of these refer to Aristotle's ethics. ![]()
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